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Abstract 
This article explores the regulatory and conceptual frameworks of the Chinese pre-trial process by 
identifying the administrative justice system as one salient component in this legal scheme. It reviews 
the major difficulties of administering pre-trial justice in accordance with the rule of law, as well as 
corresponding legislative recommendations for promoting the rule of law as a normative system in the 
operation of the pre-trial process. The article proceeds to make a claim that the idea of implementing 
the rule of law as the reformative basis to regularize the pre-trial process is most likely unsuccessful 
due to the Party’s resistance and the immaturity of the current legal system.    
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Introduction 
The Chinese pre-trial process is generally characterized by legal scholars as the 
preparatory stage of the Chinese criminal justice system (Leng & Chiu, 1985; Turack, 
1999; Fan & Zhang, 2005; Chen, 2005). At this stage, arrest, detention, investigation and 
prosecution are respectively carried out by the Chinese public security organs (the police) 
and the procurators serve the trial sessions. Professor Chen Ruihua, one of the leading 
legal professionals in China, further points out that the pre-trial process in China is 
composed of three separate and independent stages, namely initiation of a case (Li’an), 
investigation and prosecution (Chen, 2005). Each stage is regulated by self-governing 
procedural settings, constituting one fragment of the “streamlined work processes” in the 
Chinese criminal justice system (Chen, 2005). Therefore, the Chinese legal circle is 
normally inclined to examine the pre-trial process in the context of criminal justice. In 
terms of its deficiencies, legal practitioners and academics are intended to promote this 
phase by reforming the current criminal procedure law in order to meet the requirements 
of the rule of law and proceduralism (See, e.g., Chen, 2007; Chen, 2006). However, as a 
stage of implementing law prior to trial, the Chinese pre-trial process should not be 
defined exclusively as a criminal process. Rather, a uniquely designed administrative 
justice system that has been long employed in the Chinese legal history is supposed to be 
considered as another important constituent in China’s pre-trial justice system. 
In parallel with the formal criminal justice system, China’s administrative justice system 
has been in existence for several decades since its establishment in the 1950s. Unlike the 
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former that is aimed at punishing criminality, the latter serves as an effective means to deal 
with minor offences. Those who commit deviant acts, such as prostitution, drug abuse and 
public order offenses, are handled by the administrative apparatus through administrative 
procedures, and sanctioned by administrative regulations. Therefore, conceptually, the 
administrative justice system refers to the regulatory framework in which the Chinese 
authorities, particularly the police, incarcerate minor offenders under a variety of 
administrative detentions to maintain public order, social and political stability. Among all 
administrative custodial measures, Reeducation through Labor (Laodong Jiaoyang), 
Detention for Education (Shourong Jiaoyu), Coercive Drug Rehabilitation (Qiangzhi 
Jiuedu) and Public Order Detention (Zhi’an Juliu) are four major measures comprising of 
incarceration imposed on offenders who commit socially disruptive behaviors.  
Clearly, the administrative justice system is largely employed alongside the state’s 
criminal justice powers to target conduct considered to be socially disruptive (Biddulph, 
2007). Since the introduction of the economic modernization policy in the late 1970s, the 
maintenance of social control has been very important to guarantee the success of the 
economic reforms (Senger, 2000).  Many legal scholars have even argued that the policy 
of social control itself has been one of the crucial pillars of reform (Bakken, 2000; Chen, 
2002). Therefore, the administrative justice system has been heavily relied on in practice 
to serve as a “second line of defense” to preserve social order and public security.2 The use 
of administrative detention powers is viewed as a flexible tool in the hands of the police to 
address social order problems, constituting the lower level of crime prevention strategies.  
Despite the practical effect the Chinese pre-trial process exerts on the maintenance of 
social order, both the criminal pre-trial process as well as the various forms of 
administrative detentions are often portrayed as representative of China’s failure to 
establish rule of law (Peerenboom, 2004). Clearly, one of the most heavily criticized 
aspects of the Chinese criminal justice system has been the miscarriage of justice in the 
pre-trial process. Arbitrary detention, misuse of the authorities’ unfettered powers and 
exclusion of judiciary and legal counsel contribute greatly to the malpractices of this 
procedure (Song, 2003). Many legal scholars and practitioners tend to attribute these 
phenomena to some ideological causes. They, for instance, argue that the authorities’ 
mentality of favoring substantive justice over procedural justice has long dominated the 
operation of the Chinese criminal pre-trial, and hence resulting in the disregard of due 
process (Wong, 1998). Further, the investigative organs are inclined to circumvent formal 
legal procedures in an attempt to conserve valuable and limited police resources (Wong, 
1998). More crucially, the hostility of the public toward elements that are destructive of 
social order and security discourages the effective protection of the legal rights of suspects 
(Cao & Cullen, 2001). These long-standing attitudes enable the authorities to pay more 
attention to how to serve crime control rather than abide by the rule of law in their 
implementation of the law. In respect of the administrative justice system, the unsound 
legal basis and arbitrary deprivation of minor offenders’ liberty generate the two most 
destructive factors in the process of rationalizing the use of administrative detentions. 
                                                 
2 Professor Sarah Biddulph in her book views the regulation and education based on the community 
organization and mass-line policing as the ‘first line of defense’ serving the prevention of criminality in 
China. When the ‘first line of defence’ fails, the coercive police powers that serve as the ‘second line of 
defence’ take over and function as the stiffer measures to prevent criminality. 
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Many professionals thus suggest that all forms of administrative detentions are either 
abolished or reformed to meet the requirement of rule of law.  
This article first explores the formation of the pre-trial justice system in China in the 
reform era, and then focuses on its major legal and extralegal deficiencies in its actual 
operation. By viewing some reformative proposals in response to the current dilemmas of 
this process, the paper argues that the rule of law that has been strongly advocated by legal 
scholars may theoretically form the ideological basis to substantialize potential reforms. Yet 
the implementation of the rule of law in reality is most likely compromised by the Party’s 
ambivalent attitude towards the force of law and the undeveloped legal system in 
contemporary China.   
  
The Formation of China’s Pre-trial Process 
Historically, the Chinese pre-trial process has experienced an unsmooth journey since 
the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. Prior to the economic reforms 
initiated in the l980s, China had suffered from some periods of lawlessness and disorder 
where the revolutionary struggle overrode everything in the regulation of the state. (Lu, 
1995; see also Dittmer, 1974; Lee, 1978; Dittmer & Chen, 1981; Esherick, Pickowicz & 
Walder, 2006) In order to justify the administration of the “people’s justice”, China had 
first built a societal criminal justice system that emphasized the politicization of the entire 
legal process during the mass campaigns (Leng, 1977). Thus, a primary criminal pre-trial 
process was shaped by the enactment of a large number of substantive and procedural laws 
at that time. For example, the Land Reform Law (1950), the Act for the Punishment of 
Counter-revolutionaries (1951) and the Act for Punishment of Corruption (1952) 
authorized the police to dispense justice prior to ad hoc trials.3 In the meantime, an Arrest 
and Detention Act was promulgated in 1954 to formulate the imposition of custodial 
measures on criminal suspects and “class enemies” (Cohen, 1968). While a criminal 
procedure was established to target criminality, an administrative justice system was 
gradually formed for the handling of minor offenders. This legal mechanism was aimed at 
relatively unimportant misconduct that is not criminal in nature. Professor Alan Cohen 
refers to this system as the administrative roundups of “petty thieves, gamblers, opium 
addicts, whores, pimps, vagrants and other dregs of the old society” (Cohen, 1966), who 
were subjected to non-criminal reform measures executed exclusively by the police during 
the course of long confinement (Biddulph, 2007). Based on several years of experience 
with police imposition of administrative punishments, the Security Administration 
Punishment Act was enacted in 1957 in an attempt to legitimatize the use of 
administrative sanctions (Cohen, 1968), hence indicating the authorities’ commitment to 
constructing a formal administrative justice system to maintain social order alongside the 
criminal justice system.  
The Chinese pre-trial process has been significantly improved in terms of 
proceduralism and regularity since the economic and legal reforms in the late 1970s. A 
spate of laws and regulations has been adopted to standardize the criminal and 
administrative practices by law enforcement agencies prior to trial. As a surge of 
advocating the importance of the rule of law continues in the Chinese legal complex, the 
                                                 
3 The Land Reform Law, the Act for the Punishment for Counter-Revolutionaries and the Act for 
Punishment of Corruption were passed in a series of political campaigns during the period of 1949-1953, 
including the Land Reform Movement, the Suppression of Counter-Revolutionaries Movement, the Three-
Anti Movement and Five-Anti Movement.  
International Journal of Criminal Justice Sciences 
Vol 7 Issue 1 January – June 2012  
 
© 2012 International Journal of Criminal Justice Sciences. All rights reserved. Under a creative commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 2.5 India License 
 
 
401
1979 Criminal Procedure Law and its amended version in 1996 have set out many 
provisions to greatly enhance the protection of suspects’ legal rights in the criminal pre-
trial process.4 For example, to ensure that the suspect is able to access legal counsel before 
trial, the procedure laws have expanded and detailed the legal duties of defense lawyers, 
and provided that the lawyer’s pre-trial practices are legally guaranteed.5 Moreover, a large 
number of regulations and judicial interpretations have been enacted to make the 
underlying prescriptions more enforceable. The latest effort among the statutory reforms is 
the passage of the Rules on Questions about Exclusion of Illegal Evidence in Handling 
Criminal Cases and the Rules on Questions about Examining and Judging Evidence in 
Death Penalty Cases in 2010.6 These two directives were jointly issued by the Supreme 
Court, the Supreme Procuratorate, the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of 
National Security and the Ministry of Justice in an attempt to restrain the authorities’ 
discretionary powers in collecting evidence, and more importantly, to prohibit the abuse 
and ill treatment of suspects for incriminating evidence prior to trial (The Supreme Court, 
the Supreme Procuratorate, the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of National 
Security & the Ministry of Justice. 2010; Li, 2010). 
Along with the regulatory advancement in the criminal regime, the exercise of 
administrative detention powers was reinforced in both theory and practice. Due to the 
“Open-Door” policy initiated in the late 1970s, the problems of drug abuse and 
prostitution that were eradicated in the 1950s re-emerged as serious social problems 
requiring redress (Mou, 1996; Lu, Fang & Wang, 2008). Meanwhile, public order offences 
that undermine social order and stability have become the major transgression in 
contemporary China. As a consequence, the Chinese authorities have begun to re-employ 
coercive administrative measures, namely Reeducation through Labor, Detention for 
Education, Coercive Drug Rehabilitation and Public Order Detention, as a “second line 
of defense” to prevent socially disruptive behaviors from deteriorating into crime 
(Biddulph, 2007). Given that minor offences are not considered as crimes in the Chinese 
legal context, the imposition of administrative detention on minor offenders is expected to 
be reformative, educative and rehabilitative because of their aim to handle “non-
antagonistic contradiction between the people” (Mao, 1972; Yu, 1993).7 While the 
enforcement of administrative detention has increased, a considerable number of 
administrative laws and regulations were promulgated by the Chinese government in the 
reform era to further the justifications of their use. For example, on 29 November 1979 
the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress decided to reinvigorate 
Reeducation through Labor by approving the Supplementary Regulations of the State 
Council on Reeducation through Labor. Afterwards, two corresponding documents were 
passed in 1980 and 1982 respectively by the state council, namely the Notice on 
Consolidation of the Two Measures of Forced Labor and Detention for Investigation into 
                                                 
4 The Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China, adopted by the Plenary Meeting of the 
Fifth National People’s Congress on July 1 1979 and entered into force on January 1, 1980. This law was 
revised on 17 March 1997 by the Forth Meeting of the Eighth National People’s Committee, and came into 
effect on 1 January 1997. 
5 Art 36, 37, 75, the Criminal Procedure Law 1996.  
6 The Rules on Questions about Exclusion of Illegal Evidence in Handling Criminal Cases and the Rules on 
Questions about Examining and Judging Evidence in Death Penalty Cases both took effect on July 1 2010. 
7 In Mao’s speech, dealing with minor offenders falls within the scope of non-antagonistic contradiction, 
which may be handled through education and correction. 
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Reeducation through Labor and the Temporary Measures on Reeducation through 
Labor, to expand the targets of reeducation through labor and formulate its operation. At 
the same time, the Measures for Detention for Education of Prostitutes and Clients of 
Prostitutes and the Measures on Coercive Drug Rehabilitation were adopted by the State 
Council in 1993 and 1995 to deal with increasing prostitutes and drug users, serving as the 
primary legal basis of the use of detention for education and coercive drug rehabilitation. 
Clearly, the distinctive features of exercising administrative detention powers make the 
administrative justice system a true pre-trial process. In the administration of administrative 
justice, the public security organ is the sole law enforcement agency performing the legal 
duties of maintaining social order and preserving social security. Unlike the criminal pre-
trial stage where the police are only responsible for investigation and detention, the police 
in the administrative justice regime enjoy a broader scope of legal powers, ranging from 
the determination of minor offenses to the imposition of administrative detention without 
the intervention of other legal apparatus. Specifically, the people’s procuratorates and 
courts are not engaged in the process of imposing administrative custodial measures. Nor 
is there a systematic checks and balances procedure to regulate the police’s practices and 
supervise their exercise of administrative detention powers. Although the Chinese 
government enacted the Administrative Punishment Law in 1996 in order to strengthen 
the administrative offenders’ legal rights in dealing with the authorities’ superior powers, 
its applicability is more on paper than in practice. In theory, the Administrative 
Punishment Law provides that offenders are entitled to initiate a public hearing if they 
think proposed administrative punishments are unlawful or inappropriate.8 Such a legal 
privilege, however, does not apply to those who are administratively detained.9 In essence, 
the administrative detainees are only afforded two post-incarceration remedies in practice. 
First, pursuant to the Chinese Administrative Reconsideration, a detainee may apply to 
the public security organs at a higher level for an administrative reconsideration.10 
Secondly, if the applicant is not satisfied with the reconsideration decision, he/she may 
bring an administrative action in accordance with the Administrative Litigation Law 
against the concerned public security organs for their detention decisions.11 The litigation 
is usually organized in the form of a court hearing by the judiciary to examine the legality 
and reasonableness of detention decision, but the execution of detention is not suspended 
during the court sessions.12  
 
The Characteristics of China’s Pre-trial Process 
Indeed, the Chinese authorities have intended to build a normative administrative 
justice system to handle transgression based on Chinese characteristics. Yet the ruling out 
of due process and judicial supervision in the exercise of administrative detention powers 
in effect bears great similarities with the criminal pre-trial process. Specifically, there are 
three distinctive features shared by these two legal schemes, which classifies them into the 
same category.  
                                                 
8 Art 42, the Administrative Punishment Law. 
9 Art 42 states that public hearing can only be held for non-custodial administrative punishments such as 
suspension of production and business operations, revocation of business licenses and administrative fines.    
10 Art 5, the Administrative Reconsideration Law. 
11 Art 6(1), the Administrative Reconsideration Law. 
12 Art 11(1), (2), the Administrative Litigation Law.  
International Journal of Criminal Justice Sciences 
Vol 7 Issue 1 January – June 2012  
 
© 2012 International Journal of Criminal Justice Sciences. All rights reserved. Under a creative commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 2.5 India License 
 
 
403
First, in both criminal and administrative justice system, while the law enforcement 
agencies are granted discretionary powers to carry out their legal duties, offenders are often 
given limited legal rights to prevent themselves from being wrongly or illegally treated. 
The unequal power between the authorities and offenders results in the offenders’ 
vulnerability in legally defending themselves in the pre-trial process and in turn 
exacerbates the abuse of powers by law enforcement agencies due to the lack of effective 
counteraction. For example, as an effective instrument to serve the goals of completing 
investigations and preventing social instability (Shi & Ruan, 2005), pre-trial detention has 
become the preferred vehicle in handling criminal cases, including the use of unlawful 
detention and extended detention.13 Procedurally, the laws subject the imposition of pre-
trial detention to the approval by either the chief of public security organs or 
procuratorates.14 Such an internal approval system, however, is merely a bureaucratic 
formality, which barely assures the lawfulness of detention due to its non-transparent 
procedure (Huang, 2007). It is because as the important accusatory organs, it is unrealistic 
to expect the police and procuratorates to neutrally examine the legality and necessity of 
detention prior to trial (Huang, 2005). On the other hand, the suspect is afforded very few 
legal rights to challenge the detention decision. The rights that suspects may expect are 
either insufficient to counteract the authorities’ paramount power, or, even though those 
minimal legal rights are in theory workable, largely unreliable in practice. 
Second, the court that is supposed to function as the last arbitrator to oversee the 
administration of justice at the pre-trial phase is entirely excluded. In the criminal 
procedure, for example, the police and the procuratorates carry out the investigatory and 
procuratorial activities, respectively, without the intervention of the judiciary. At the 
investigatory phase, the investigatory agencies enjoy the full power to carry out the 
investigation, ranging from the approval of custodial measures to the restriction on the 
lawyer’s early involvement. At the procuratorial stage, the people’s procuratorates 
continue to possess enormous power in preparing public prosecution. The procuratorates 
may keep the suspect in custody after the case is transferred from the police, reject the 
lawyer’s demand for collected evidence, and even return the case to the police for 
supplementary investigation if the evidence is inadequate to support a successful 
prosecution. It is noteworthy that none of these aforementioned practices are subject to 
judicial examination. It in reality turns the Chinese pre-trial process into a purely 
administrative procedure at the expense of an adversarial system of criminal procedure. 
Moreover, China’s pre-trial process fails to position a judicial review system to limit and 
correct the authorities’ deprivation of citizen’s liberty. In the administrative justice regime, 
for example, the imposition of administrative detention is subject to the police’s individual 
understanding of the law. The public security organs are able to willfully send the 
defaulters to administrative detention centers without due process. Minor offenders in 
practice are offered no means to challenge the detention decision and seek redress from 
the courts during incarceration.  
Third, the lawyer’s role is minimized in both justice mechanisms. Although the 
Chinese government has sought to promote the lawyer’s stature through legislation and 
                                                 
13 Chen Ruihua, ‘The Legal Analysis of Extended Detention (Chaoqi Jiya Wenti de Falv Fenxi)’ (2000) 9 
People’s Procuratorate (Renmin Jiancha) 7. 
14 Art. 106, the Procedural Rules of Public Security Organs in Handling Criminal Cases; Art 124-127, the 
Criminal Procedure Law 1996. 
Li - Between Reality and Idea: Implementing the Rule of Law in China’s Pre-trial Process
 
© 2012 International Journal of Criminal Justice Sciences. All rights reserved. Under a creative commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 2.5 India License 
 
404
advocacy of the rule of law, the lawyers’ defense work is in reality hampered by a number 
of legal and extralegal factors. In the criminal justice system, although the law has 
increased the lawyers’ legal rights in the performance of their defense work, “Three 
Difficulties”, namely meeting criminal suspects in detention, getting access to case files, 
and collecting evidence, constitute the three biggest struggles for criminal defense prior to 
trial (Halliday & Liu, 2007). It is because notwithstanding the Criminal Procedure Law 
1996 tends to expand the role of the defense lawyer, its corresponding regulations, such as 
judicial interpretations, provide conflicting provisions in the consideration of the interests 
of law enforcement agencies (Liu & Halliday, 2009). This legal indeterminacy surely 
increases confusion and reduces certainty in the lawyer’s operation of defense duties, and 
hence deteriorating the lawyer’s role in the administration of pre-trial justice. In addition 
to legal uncertainty, a wide range of extralegal elements, including the Chinese unique 
political, institutional and ideological frameworks, also wield the chilling effect on the 
willingness of lawyers to take on criminal and administrative detention cases (See, e.g., 
Chen, 2008)   
  
The Deficiencies and Corresponding Reforms of China’s Pre-trial Process 
Three decades of legal reform from the days of Mao has produced remarkable changes 
with respect to laws, practices, institutions in China’ pre-trial justice system. Over time, a 
socialist pre-trial stage with two-tier line of defense has been formed and had a profound 
impact on China’s crime prevention and social order policies. But the reality shows that 
the pre-trial process in China remains in essence a system of rule by law rather than the 
rule of law. Professor Randall Peerenboom identifies rule by law as a form of 
instrumentalism where law is merely a tool to be used by the state to control others 
without imposing meaningful restraints on the state itself. In such a scheme, law is not 
supreme and is usually trumped by the dictates and political policies of the rulers 
(Peerenboom, 2002). This scenario pertinently reflects the authorities’ practices in China’s 
pre-trial process, where law is usually designed, interpreted and used to serve the official 
goals of crime control and punishment. The authorities themselves, however, are neither 
challenged nor constrained by law in the exercise of their powers. 
Therefore, many legal scholars have sought to explore the deeper roots both within and 
outside the legal context to explain this dilemma. Professor Chen Ruihua, for example, 
claims that one of the most salient causes of the miscarriage of justice at the pre-trial stage 
is the lack of a neutral and independent checks and balances system (Chen, 2005). Such a 
review scheme is expected to effectively supervise and restrain the authorities’ practices to 
ensure that the equilibrium of powers between the suspect and the law enforcement 
agencies maintained prior to trial (Chen, 2008). Further, he asserts that the institutional 
and conceptual frameworks of the criminal justice system in China discourage the pre-trial 
process from being operated in a legal and fair manner (Chen, 2005). Chen argues that the 
unique “streamlined work” pattern of administering pre-trial criminal justice enables the 
Chinese police and the procuratorates to carry out the investigatory and procuratorial 
activities, respectively, without the intervention of the judiciary (Chen, 2008). The 
judiciary, however, is viewed as the last arbiter in the entire criminal process to ensure that 
“criminal justice” is finally served (Chen, 2008). In such an operational model, the police 
and procuratorates are afforded paramount powers to perform their legal duties in an 
unlimited fashion, while the judiciary is required to collaborate with them to achieve the 
ultimate goal of crime control (Chen, 2008). 
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In respect of the administrative justice system, the authorities’ discretionary power in 
the imposition of administrative detention merits more serious attention as well. Professor 
Randall Peerenboom, while favoring the retention of administrative detentions, admits 
that the lack of due process, including a prompt judicial review system, is likely to result in 
the malpractice of the administrative justice system (Peerenboom, 2004). In his view, 
although eliminating administrative detentions and subjecting minor offenders to the 
criminal sanctions will push them into the harsh and decidedly unfriendly penal system, 
force them to live with hardened criminals, and result in their being forever stigmatized as 
convicts (Peerenboom, 2004), the widespread use of administrative detention in 
contemporary China fails to provide a solid legal basis to deprive offenders’ liberty 
(Peerenboom, 2004). This perception is echoed by another China-law academic, Professor 
Sarah Biddulph, who perceives Chinese administrative detentions as the product of the 
“second line of defense” (police administrative powers) (Biddulph, 2007). While asserting 
that administrative detention forms an integral and distinctive part of the social order, 
which facilitates flexibility in dealing with the changing problems of social order 
(Biddulph, 2004), she points out that Chinese administrative detention powers are poorly 
defined and abusively used (Biddulph, 2007). It is thus imperative to legalize the 
environment in which administrative detention powers are defined, enforced and 
supervised. She believes that legislation in this case is a way of providing legal grounds to 
justify the existence of the administrative justice system and will necessarily result in the 
restraint on the abuse of administrative power (Biddulph, 2007). 
In response to aforementioned ideological and practical deficiencies, many legal 
professionals and practitioners have provided the government their reformative thoughts 
and proposals on how to reform China’s pre-trial justice system over the last decade. Not 
surprisingly, the propositions are aimed mainly at procedural justice and limits on the 
authorities’ powers (The People’s Procuratorates, 2007; Wang & Peng, 2007). Professor 
Chen Guangzhong, for example, suggests a massive modification for the CPL 1997 in 
compliance with universally accepted norms of human rights protection. He claims in his 
book that the current criminal procedure law only provides general and abstract principles 
that are theoretically consistent with international standards. The practical implementation 
in essence falls far short of the minimum requirements and necessitates an overhaul of the 
legislation (Chen, 2005). Professor Chen Ruihua and Lawyer Tian Wenchang, on the 
other hand, intend to amend the CPL 1997 by focusing on the heightening of the 
lawyer’s stature in the criminal procedure. They argue that the lawyer’s defense power 
needs to be greatly strengthened to directly protect the suspects’ legal rights, in order to 
counterbalance the authorities’ paramount discretion (Tian & Chen, 2007). 
In the field of the administrative justice, Professor Sarah Biddulph calls for the 
legalization of administrative detention powers and the limitation of state or police power 
(Biddulph, 2007). She claims that viewed by the rule of law framework, police powers in 
imposing administrative detention should be subject to legal norms and separated from the 
Party’s control (Biddulph, 2007). Most importantly, a legal scheme that regulates and 
controls the exercise of state power, in particular to control chronic abuse by the police of 
their administrative detention powers ought to be built (Biddulph, 2007). A number of 
Chinese scholars, however, are inclined to borrow European Security Defense 
Punishment (Bao’an Chufen) to regulate administrative detentions as a whole (See, e.g., 
Wang, 1996; Fang, 2002; Chen, 2004). They believe that the Chinese minor offenders 
subjected to the administrative detentions shared the same characteristics of those in the 
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security defense system, and need to be treated under a different system other than 
administrative incarceration or criminal sanctions (Fang, 2002; Chen, 2004). I, on the 
other hand, illustrate that the general reforms aimed at the formulation and rationalization 
of the use of administrative detentions are of no use to the realization of educative, 
rehabilitative functions in helping minor offenders go back the society and their 
community. I therefore conclude that a community correctional scheme that provides 
community-based programs to re-socialize minor offenders is a more effective way to 
prevent recidivism and further crime (Li, 2010).  
 
Is the Rule of Law Applicable in the Promotion of China’s Pre-trial Process?    
It thus gives rise to a question whether a rule-of-law legal system may be a prerequisite 
to all proposed reforms of constructing a regularized pre-trial justice system. In contrast to 
the rule by law norm, the rule of law, according to Professor Eric Orts, refers to “a 
normative and political theory of the relationship of legal institutions and the political state 
that includes, but is not limited to, a theory of limited government through some form of 
constitutional separation between the judiciary and other state powers” (Orts, 2001). 
Simply put, the rule of law means to rule the country in accordance with law, and 
requires that the law imposes restraints on the state and its rulers (Peerenboom, 2002). 
This definition seemingly suggests that rule of law may shape the theoretical basis to build 
a legalized pre-trial process, where a truly balanced distribution of powers between the 
authorities and offenders is expectable.  
 
1. The Party’s Influence 
China has endorsed the rule of law since the mid 1990s. Since then, numerous laws 
and regulations have been enacted at both the national and local level, while considerable 
efforts and resources have been spent on the developments of legal institutions and 
profession (Zou, 2000). In practice, however, the implementation of the rule of law has 
been unsatisfactory in China. Many scholars argue that the Chinese political framework, 
namely single party socialism, is incompatible with the rule of law because the Party is 
reluctant to subject its power to law (Lubman, 1999). This view is particularly reflected in 
the launch of the “hard strike” campaigns. During the crackdowns, many new “laws and 
regulations” were passed, and instrumentally employed as the disguise of political policies 
(Lubman, 2006). The authorities were in reality required to follow the “new legislation” 
as the operational guides in lieu of the existing laws. Not surprisingly, while the Party 
enjoys using law as an instrument to enforce Party policies, it is unlikely that the ruling 
elites will impose any restraints on their wide discretion. This certainly explains the long-
standing lack of checks and balances mechanism and the plight of lawyers in the Chinese 
pre-trial process. Even though the CPL 1997 and relevant administrative regulations set 
out procedural requirements to control the abuse of the authorities’ powers, the 
effectiveness is actually subject to the Party’s willingness to abide by them. 
Therefore, one of the most crucial factors that may promote the operation of China’s 
pre-trial process, or the prospect of relevant legal reforms, is whether the state is prepared 
to unconditionally implement rule of law. It is noted that some legal professionals are at 
odds with the mainstream view over the Party’s influence on the enforcement of the rule 
of law. Professor Randall Peerenboom, for instance, takes the view that the Party in China 
now only plays a limited role in the daily operation of the legal system (Peerenboom, 
2002). While acknowledging the Party is still a major force influencing the direction of 
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legal reforms, he points out that the Party’s role has retreated and its power has been 
transferred to the society and law enforcement agencies (Peerenboom, 2002). He further 
argues that the obstacles to realizing a law-based order is diverse, including a weak 
judiciary, poorly trained judges and lawyers, immature legal consciousness and unsound 
legal system (Peerenboom, 2002). Indeed, since the 2000s China has underpinned the 
supremacy of law and tended to prioritize law over power in the governance of the state. 
The efforts to promote the legal infrastructure and environment have also been made in 
the context of ongoing legal reforms (Orts, 2001). However, the extent to which these 
intentions are substantialized is doubtful, as the Party has long shown its skeptical and 
ambivalent attitudes towards the force of law and the impact of legal reform in the 
regulation of the country.  
The reasons are multi-faceted. Above all, the aforementioned reforms require a drastic 
transformation in philosophy of administering pre-trial justice. Since the establishment of 
the formal criminal justice system, the Party has been struggling to solve conflicts between 
striking crimes and protecting human rights, substantive justice and procedural justice and 
justice and efficiency (Liu & Halliday, 2009). The CPL 1997 is actually a product of 
balancing these opposite interests (Liu & Halliday, 2009). In this law, lots of inner 
contradictions are present, including some obvious conflicting prescriptions. 
Unsurprisingly, given China’s criminal procedure has long been dominated by the rhetoric 
of punishment and retribution, the authorities are concerned that the shift of focus onto 
the suspects’ rights in any further revision is likely to hinder the state’s ultimate pursuit of 
crime control. For example, the strengthening of suspects’ rights in the pre-trial process 
necessarily entails the improvement of the lawyer’s legal entitlements and limitations on 
the authorities’ discretion. The state will have to take the interests of every participant in 
the pre-trial process into account to re-allocate their powers in order to create an 
adversarial balance between the accusatory and the suspect. Similarly, as administrative 
detention is characterized as an adjunct to criminal sanction in China’s social order policy 
(Biddulph, 2007), its use is philosophically consistent with criminal justice, and shows the 
punitive and deterrent elements in preserving social order. Although concerns have often 
been raised about the legality of administrative detention, the government is unwilling to 
rationalize administrative detention powers with the higher degree of legitimacy. This is 
because the current administrative justice system has so far served as a very effective 
instrument in structuring crime prevention strategies. Any ideological redefining of 
administrative detention may lead to confusion in its use, hence undermining far-reaching 
social order policies.      
Secondly, the reforms are most likely to result in the radical changes to the institutional 
and conceptual framework of the pre-trial process, for which the Party may have not yet 
been prepared. Specifically, to comply with the rule of law, the legal duties of law 
enforcement agencies may be re-assigned to meet the procedural requirement of legality. 
A judicial checks and balances mechanism, for instance, has proven badly needed at the 
pre-trial stage. It means that the introduction of such a review system requires the role of 
the judiciary to be re-specified, because the Chinese Constitution explicitly states that the 
People’s Procuratorate is now the only supervisory organ in the Chinese legal system. At 
the same time, the reforms are to compel the police and procuratorates to adjust their new 
roles. It is foreseeable that the adoption of a judicial checks and balances system is going to 
take over their most exclusive powers, such as the discretion to detain suspects without 
due process prior to trial, and oversee their practices in the administration of justice. In the 
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meantime, the legalization of administrative detention powers necessitates structural and 
philosophical reforms as well in the contemporary administrative justice system. For 
example, as imposing punitive administrative detention is unlikely to benefit offenders’ re-
socialization and their reintegration into the society, community correction based on 
educational programs becomes a proper alternative to serve the ultimate goals of 
correction and rehabilitation (Li, in press). This proposition hence requires a wholesale 
retreat of the police and increasing reliance on community resources, including the street 
committees, social organizations, community voluntary workers and legal practitioners. 
Moreover, to ensure that community correction will be operated in a rule-of-law manner, 
the judiciary must be involved, playing an arbitral role in determining whether a minor 
offender should be sent to receive community treatment. Clearly, these reforms are to re-
conceptualize the inherent functions of law enforcement agencies and systematize the legal 
institutions in accordance with the rule of law. It is thus difficult to judge how keen the 
Party is to make such effort and how deeply China’s legal culture will bear the imprint of 
new characters of law enforcement agencies. 
Thirdly, notwithstanding that China has begun to accept the international norms, such 
as human rights, derived from western legal regimes, the Party is reluctant to fully 
incorporate them into domestic laws. China has always insisted that adoption of universal 
rules ought to depend on local circumstances, such as cultural, ideological and economic 
particularities (Peerenboom, 2005). In particular in the field of human rights protection, 
the government believes that greater weight should be placed on collective rights, and 
more importantly, on the interests of the state (Weatherley, 1999; Gang, 1994). The state 
is therefore hesitant to greatly strengthen suspects’ and offenders’ rights in the pre-trial 
process. Influenced by the far-reaching rhetoric of crime control, it is not surprising that 
the Chinese government has encountered greater difficulties in balancing the goal of 
punishing criminals to protect the community and the requirement of safeguarding the 
suspects’ human rights to ensure legality (Ting, 2004). In essence, although the supremacy 
of crime control has been widely used as a pretext to rationalize the state’s resistance, the 
Party is more worried about the threat posed by philosophical globalization to its 
sovereignty. China, as a single-party country, is concerned that the extensive 
acknowledgement of international laws and principles may invite external interference in 
its domestic affairs (Li & Jia, 2009). Some scholars, for example, take the view that the 
signing of the international human rights treaties enables the western society to justifiably 
criticize China’s human rights record (Guo, 2003). It specifically shows in China’s attitude 
to the annual reports issued by the US State Department and the Amnesty International 
on China’s human rights situation. In response to criticism, the government 
discontentedly calls the allegations groundless and accuses those making the allegations of 
interfering in its internal affairs and undermining the state’s political stability (CNN 
Politics, 2009). It is true that while China has now developed as one of the most open-
minded nations in the world, the Party’s political supremacy is viewed superior to 
everything. Therefore, some political academics impliedly point out that the assimilation 
of some western ideologies in the Chinese social and regulatory frameworks may arouse 
the expectation of the public towards bourgeois democracy and values, which are in 
conflict with Chinese political teachings (Chen, 2006). 
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2. The Unprepared Legal System 
It has been evidenced that the Chinese Communist Party values its control over 
Chinese society more than it does legal reform (Lubman, 1999) Therefore, China’s legal 
development is more driven by the Party’s will in achieving certain political goals rather 
than a product responding to the social values of the dominant culture. As such, the 
Party’s resoluteness to subject its power to the law according to the rule of law determines 
the further institutionalization and legalization of China’s pre-trial process. However, the 
rule of law theory requires not only meaningful restraints on state power, but also a 
comprehensive and well-enforced legal system where fair procedures and consistent 
enforcement of the law in the form of trials, hearings, rules of evidence and due process 
are present (Woo, 1999). Despite the fact that the Chinese government has embarked on 
legal reforms since the late 1970s, the legal system in China is dysfunctional and corrupt 
(Chen, 1983; Potter, 1999). Therefore, even if the Party tends to enforce rule of law in 
the administration of pre-trial justice, the existing legal culture and practice creates the 
great practical obstacles in its genuine implementation.  
It is widely acknowledged that China’s legal system severely suffers from legal 
indeterminacy and uncertainty in the current legislation (Potter, 2004), which is likely to 
discourage the state from implementing the rule of law. In the legal hierarchy of the pre-
trial procedure, there are a large number of laws and corresponding regulations found to 
formulate the administration of pre-trial justice. It is because the Chinese lawmakers opt to 
intentionally draft laws in broad terms with more general language. Meanwhile, they are 
fond of issuing complementary rules to interpret loosely-defined laws, such as the CPL 
1996, to allow local bureaucrats to exercise considerable ingenuity in promoting domestic 
interests (Lubman, 1999). While ideological and structural contradictions arise due to the 
enormous quantity of legislation at the different levels, ambiguities and inconsistencies in 
the implementation of the law are produced (Liu & Halliday, 2009). Indeed, many legal 
scholars wish to reform the pre-trial process by significantly modifying the CPL 1997 and 
drafting new laws to regulate the use of administrative detentions. Yet how to solve the 
disparities between proposed legislation and existing operating regulations remain 
unanswered. It is not uncommon that many provinces and major cities have enacted 
supplementary criminal and administrative regulations pursuant to their local conditions. 
In particular in the administrative justice system, localities rely heavily on the provincial 
rules and directives that cohere with the domestic characteristics to handle administrative 
offenders. It thus gives rise to the concern that new legislation may continue to exhibit 
characteristics that marked earlier norms. While the underlying laws are modified at a 
macro level, the localities are most likely to continue their drafting of interpretative 
regulations to clarify new undefined and ambiguous provisions in the consideration of 
local interests.  
Second, a powerless judiciary is unable to bolster the procedural requirements of the 
rule of law. By examining the pre-trial process in China, a judicial checks and balances 
scheme has been widely viewed as a protective vehicle to ensure legality and constraints 
on the authorities’ powers (Chen, 2008; Li & Liu, 2006). However, this institutional 
setting is most likely compromised by the unprofessionalism and limited authority of the 
Chinese courts. Many legal scholars claim that implementation of the law by the courts 
has been severely hampered by judges’ low levels of legal education and professional 
standards (Lubman, 1999; Peerenboom, 2002; Wang, 2008). As many judges in China are 
transferred from military and administrative posts (Peerenboom, 2002), they are actually 
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poorly trained and find it difficult to catch up with ever-developing legal norms 
(Peerenboom, 2001). It thus raises the doubt over whether the Chinese judges are capable 
of playing the examining and supervisory role in a check and balances system. As 
suggested in the potential reforms, such a review scheme is supposed to serve as an 
impartial and authoritative arbitrator to balance the interests between the suspect and the 
authorities prior to trial. Accordingly, the judges are expected to regulate and control the 
authorities’ practices according to the rule of law on one hand, and to guarantee the 
realization of legal rights of suspects and their lawyers on the other hand. These legal 
obligations suggest that the judges must acquire solid legal knowledge and a thorough 
understanding of rule-of-law principle. More importantly, the judiciary has to adapt the 
transition of its role from the last actor in adjudication to the arbiter throughout the pre-
trial process. For example, given the Chinese criminal process is seen as a “streamlined 
process” where the police, procuratorates and courts are responsible for the operation of 
the investigatory, procuratorial and trial stage respectively, the judiciary, upon taking up 
the checks and balances duties, is required to obtain the same level of expertise, experience 
and knowledge as the police and procuratorates in the administration of pre-trial justice. 
Therefore, although since the late 1990 China has made lots of efforts to improve the 
quality of the judiciary,15 the courts in contemporary China are seemingly unable to 
quickly undertake the new commitments due to their incompetence and unskilledness.  
The uncertainty of the judiciary to promote the rule of law is also attributed to the 
scarcity autonomy of the courts in the Chinese legal system. Many legal professionals 
observe that the Chinese judges are unlikely to decide cases independently in accordance 
with the law and without interference from other parties (Woo, 1991; He, 2004). 
Professor Peerenboom, for example, affirms that the courts’ practice is largely interfered by 
both external and internal resources (Peerenboom, 2002). External interference refers to 
influences imposed by the Party, the legislature, the government, the bureaucracy, the 
other law enforcement agencies and social organizations. Internal interference means the 
intervention from inner resources, including senior judges, adjudicative committees, 
political-legal committees and higher levels of the courts (Peerenboom, 2002). It is true 
that the Chinese judges are in practice compelled to take account of a variety of extra-
legal interests when they decide cases. In particular, in the courts’ handling of specific cases 
and during the periods of nationwide campaigns such as “Hard Strike” movements, the 
judges are frequently asked to follow the central guides in adjudication and enforcement of 
law (Zhu, 2006). Further, in the institutional framework of the criminal procedure, the 
judiciary has always been a weakest law enforcement organ. Given the unique Chinese 
legal culture makes the judiciary a last actor to only carry out adjudication in the criminal 
process, the court in fact has little chance expressing its opinions on the handling of cases. 
Rather, to coincide with the ultimate goal of crime control, the judiciary has to 
coordinate with the police and procuratorates, and sometimes even take the directions 
from them (Chen, 2005). As such, there is every reason to believe that it is a long journey 
ahead for the Chinese judiciary to obtain independence and needed authority. Even if a 
judicial checks and balances mechanism is finally established, its practice would be more 
formalist than functional. Without a deep reform of the hierarchical structure of criminal 
justice, the enforcement of law by the judiciary will remain highly supervised and 
                                                 
15 For example, China passed the Judges Law in 1995 to address the issues of existing judges who lacked 
sufficient legal training, setting out the higher standards to qualify as a judge.  
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disrespected, gradually becoming similar to that in administrative agencies (Lubman, 1999; 
Chen, 2008).  
 
Conclusion 
Clearly, both subjective and objective elements manifest an unfavorable path ahead for 
the implementation of rule of law in China. Indeed, the adoption of a genuine rule-of-law 
legal system entails not only regulatory and institutional reforms, but also the transition in 
the ideology of administering pre-trial justice. It will certainly revolutionize the existing 
legal system and culture, and bring them up to a more advanced level that the current 
legal resources are inferior to. In particular, when a variety of interests are tangled and 
sometimes opposed in the pre-trial process, the operation of this procedure according to 
rule of law will have to sacrifice the incompatible philosophies, such as the unduly pursuit 
of crime control, in an attempt to guarantee justice and legality. Although China has 
undergone, and continues to be in the midst of, remarkable transformations of legal 
practice and development, its deep-rooted legal tradition and political framework do not 
allow a radical alteration in the Chinese legal system. Therefore, without China’s true 
realization of the significance of law in the governance of the country, the proposed 
reforms are unlikely to practically achieve the legalization of the pre-trial justice system.                                
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